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Abstract: As narrative conceptions of selfhood have gained more acceptance within various disciplines 
including philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences, so too have these conceptions been critically 
appraised. Chief among those who are suspicious of the overall viability of ‘narrative identity’ is the 
philosopher, Galen Strawson. In this paper, I develop five arguments underlying Strawson’s critique of 
narrative identity, and respond to each argument from the perspective of the hermeneutic phenomenology 
of Paul Ricœur. Though intuitive, I demonstrate that none of Strawson’s arguments are cogent. The	confrontation	between	these	two	figures	highlights	a	deep	conceptual	disagreement	about	our	epistemic	access	to	 the	 self,	 which	 has	 thus	 far	 gone	 unrecognized	 in	 the	 Anglo-American	 discussion,	 so	 that	 it	 raises	 a	 new	problem	for	the	metaphysics	of	personal	identity. 
Keywords: Narrative Identity, Personal Identity, the Self, Ipseity, Existential, and Phenomenological Hermeneutics. 
Résumé: Dans la mesure où les conceptions narratives de l'individu ont été mieux acceptées dans diverses 
disciplines, notamment la philosophie, la psychologie et les sciences cognitives, ces conceptions ont 
également fait l'objet d'une évaluation critique. Le philosophe Galen Strawson est le chef de file de ceux qui 
se méfient de la viabilité globale de ”l’identité narrative.” Dans cet article, je développe cinq arguments qui 
sous-tendent la critique de l'identité narrative par Strawson et répond à chacun d’eux du point de vue de la 
phénoménologie herméneutique de Paul Ricœur. Bien que de nature intuitive, je démontre qu'aucun des 
arguments de Strawson n’est convaincant. La confrontation entre ces deux figures met en évidence un 
profond désaccord conceptuel sur notre accès épistémique au soi, qui n’a pas encore été reconnu dans la 
discussion anglo-américaine, et qui pose un nouveau problème à la métaphysique de l’identité personnelle. 
MOTS-CLÉS: Identité narrative, identité personnelle, le moi, l'ipséité, l'herméneutique existentielle et 
phénoménologique. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Without question, Time and Narrative marked an important philosophical turn in 
Ricœur’s hermeneutic phenomenology.1 The task of a hermeneutic philosophical anthropology 
required moving beyond unlocking the meaning-potential of sentence-level discourse, and 
towards that of longer chains of sentences—i.e. narratives, minimally construed. Ricœur’s ‘wager’ 
was singular: not only do the tropes offered by narrative understanding disclose something about 
human living that goes beyond the confines of descriptive language, narrativity itself 
reconfigures time, such that human existence within time becomes possible in the first place.2 
Though Ricœur is known as a philosopher who makes small, careful moves, the 
conclusion of Time and Narrative left several avenues open for future philosophical reflection. One 
such avenue is the role that narratives have in shaping one’s identity, if not fully constituting it. 
As Ricœur states: “The self of self knowledge is the fruit of an examined life, to recall Socrates’ 
phrase in the Apology. And an examined life is, in large part, one purged, one clarified by the 
cathartic effects of the narratives, be they historical or fictional, conveyed by our culture.”3 
Recently, narrative conceptions of identity have come to face greater critical scrutiny. To 
this end, the work of Galen Strawson has been particularly instructive. From Strawson’s 
perspective, narrative theories of identity are, at best, trivial, and, at worst, pernicious.4 Given 
Ricœur’s death in 2005, he was never able to critically respond to Strawson’s critique. I would like 
to offer a Ricœurian response to Galen Strawson’s anti-narrative arguments. First, I will 
synthesize five arguments against narrative theories of identity, as laid out by Strawson. Second, 
I will begin to develop Ricœur’s response to the Strawsonian position by indicating the points of 
discontinuity between Strawson’s account of narrativity and Ricœur’s. Third, I will develop 
Ricœur’s notion of narrative identity by connecting his account of narrativity to the dialectic of 
idem- and ipse-identity that he later establishes in Oneself as Another. I will conclude, then, by 
demonstrating how Ricœur’s own narrative theory would address each of Strawson’s arguments. 
Ultimately, the	confrontation	between	these	two	figures	highlights	a	deep	conceptual	disagreement	about	our	epistemic	access	to	the	self,	which	has	thus	far	gone	unrecognized	in	the	Anglo-American	discussion. 
THE PRIORITY OF EPISODICITY: GALEN STRAWSON’S ANTI-NARRATIVIST POSITION  
I will begin by making three moves. First, following Schechtman’s lead, I will unpack 
some of the basic philosophical positions on which Strawson hinges his critique.5 Second, I will 
develop his definition of narrativity—i.e. what is it that ‘counts’ as a narrative theory of identity. 
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Lastly, I will synthesize five arguments against narrative theories, to which I will later formulate 
a Ricœurian response. 
1. Strawson makes a distinction between two possible theses one can hold with regard to 
narrativity.6 On the one hand, there is the “psychological Narrativity thesis,” which Strawson 
takes to arise from an empirical observation on the way human beings naturally experience their 
own lives.7 Namely, “human beings typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative 
story of some sort.”8 On the other hand, there is the “ethical Narrativity thesis,” which makes a 
normative claim on one’s relationship to narrativity.9 Regardless of the psychological thesis’s 
truth-value, a human being ought to conceive of herself narratively; doing so is “essential to a 
well lived life, to true or full personhood.”10 The relationship between these two theses is 
nuanced. It is logically possible for someone to affirm the truth of both, to assert that only—and 
any—one of the two is true, while the other is false, or to maintain that both are false.11 
Maintaining the falsity of both is Strawson’s position. 
In order to refute both the psychological and ethical theses, Strawson draws upon 
another distinction: that of diachronicity and episodicity.12 This distinction rests on the 
observation that there are two ways in which one can experience oneself. One’s self-experience 
can be diachronic; i.e. “one naturally figures oneself, considered as a self, as something that was 
there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future.”13 However, one’s self-
experience may be episodic in nature, which, at least initially, is simply the negation of 
diachronic self-experience. As such, “one does not figure oneself, considered as a self, as 
something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future.”14 At this 
initial stage, Strawson places the diachronic style and the episodic style on an axis—one can be 
either more diachronic or more episodic, and one’s styling may change over time. Further, the 
distinction between the two styles is not entirely absolute.15 It is possible, using Strawson’s own 
examples, for an episodic to identify with, say, a memory of a long past embarrassment, or feel 
nausea over the (increasingly less temporally distant) reality of death.16 Likewise, a diachronic 
may fail to make an apperceptive or appropriative link with a past moment or experience. Here, 
Strawson offers his oft used example of Henry James, who, while recognizing that he is the same 
person who wrote a literary masterpiece in the past, simply cannot identify his current self with 
his past self.17 We may also refer to John Davenport’s example of Morgan Freeman’s character, 
Ellis Boyd, in the Shawshank Redemption, who equally cannot recognize himself, the elderly Boyd, 
with the young man who committed murder.18 
Earlier, I indicated that the distinction between diachronicity and episodicity would 
create an opening for Strawson’s critique of narrative identity (via the refutation of both the 
psychological and ethical thesis.) The basis for this lies in his claim that the episodic style is as 
true as, if not more preferable than, the diachronic style. Here, Strawson lays down his 
metaphysical position for transient, short-term selves.19 Strawson’s position rests on two 
positions.20 First, there is a clear difference between taking oneself as a whole—that is, as a 
human being who has lived such and such a life, etc.—and taking oneself to be “an inner mental 
entity, a self that coincides with every conscious lived experience.”21 When talking of the self in 
the sense of a mental presence (and nothing more,) Strawson employs words like I*, my*, you*, 
etc. Second, it does not follow that I*, taken only as an inner mental entity, am the same entity that 
was present in the past, or will be the same in the future.22 In other words, it is metaphysically 
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possible, according to Strawson, that I*, who am doing whatever I* am doing now, am not 
identical to the I* who initially wrote this example. In argument form, Strawson’s justification 
might look like this: 
What we call a “self” emerges from conscious lived experience. 
Corresponding to each conscious lived experience is a distinct mental state. (i.e. 
imagination is different from perception, which is different from memory, etc.) 
If the self emerges from conscious lived experience, and each experience has a distinct 
mental state, then there is not one self, but many—one for each distinct experience. 
Therefore, episodicity is true. 
If cogent, this demonstrates that an episodic life is as viable as a diachronic one. Further, it 
may even be preferable to a diachronic one, since living this way is closer to the 
metaphysical truth. 
2. If we have followed Strawson up to this point, we have reason to favor episodicity 
over diachronicity. But what about narrative identity? What about the psychological and ethical 
theses? One question at a time. According to Strawson, narrative identity arises from a 
combination of certain features—four in total. First is diachronicity.23 By itself, however, this is 
not enough to establish narrative identity; one could be a diachronic without supporting the 
psychological thesis. One could very well be, say, a substance dualist, and thus the diachronic 
nature of one’s self-experience would be due to a soul-like substance—however philosophically 
problematic this position is. 
It is when we combine diachronicity with another feature—a “form-finding tendency” in 
one’s life—which narrative identity emerges.24 According to Strawson, this tendency is largely a 
constructive process; that is, in attempting to find coherency in the myriad of experiences one has 
lived through, one construes, constructs, “a pattern of narrative development” in one’s life.25 The 
form-finding tendency allows for a smooth transition into the third possible feature, a “story-
telling” tendency; i.e. beyond seeking patterns in one’s life, one begins to select events and 
connect them into “the form of some recognized narrative genre.”26 Lastly, the combination of 
the form-finding and storytelling tendency leaves narrative identity open to one more feature—
one that may be particularly problematic—revision.27 By revision, Strawson does not mean 
simply changing one’s views on one’s past (e.g. coming to appreciate the significance of what 
were once-dreaded yearly family vacations.) Revision entails the conscious or non-conscious 
falsification of events in one’s life-story. Strawson concedes that revision need not be a feature of 
narrative identity—in fact, episodics can also be victims of revision, insofar as revision entails not 
just a falsification of one’s life story, but of one’s episodic memories. However, when it is present 
in narrative identity, it can surely undermine its integrity. 
3. All the pieces are now in place to lay out Strawson’s arguments against narrative 
identity. All of Strawson’s arguments will follow either from his episodic metaphysics, or from 
his definition of narrative identity. As such, the first argument was already developed above, i.e. 
the argument for multiple selves. If the self is an inner mental entity that emerges from 
experience, and if the self that coincides with experience is distinct according to each experience, 
then episodicity is true. The self of one experience is not necessarily the self of another 
experience. 
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The second argument sets out to refute the psychological narrativity thesis. Let us call it 
the argument from episodicity. If Strawson’s transient, multiple self theory is true, then the 
diachronic style of self-understanding rests on a mistake in judgment. If the diachronic style is an 
error in judgment, then we ought to be episodic. As Strawson says, “if you’re episodic, you’re not 
narrative.”28 Therefore, the psychological narrativity thesis does not follow. 
We can identify the third argument as the argument from narrative egoism. Narrative 
identity theorists tend to make the claim that it is not possible to live a full or (morally) 
flourishing life without adopting a narrative framework of self-understanding. Here, Strawson 
even quotes Ricœur: 
How, indeed, could a subject of action give an ethical character to his or her own life taken 
as a whole if this life were not gathered together in some way, and how could this occur if 
not precisely, in the form of a narrative?29  
But is this view truly one that would enable us to lead a fully moral life, or is it actually, 
as Strawson suggests, “motivated by a sense of [one’s] own importance… that is absent in other 
human beings?”30 Indeed, in a more recent publication,31 Strawson makes the following 
observation: 
[We] have a rich way of talking about [unattractive self-concerned emotions]—as when 
we say that people are self-satisfied, smug, self-righteous, complacent and holier-than-
thou… Our model of morally good people seems to require that they be somehow 
ignorant of the fact that they are morally good, on pain of corruption.32 
The gesture here is straightforward: the form-finding features of narrative identity entails 
an exclusive concern for one’s self, and this can diminish, rather than enable, ethical action. 
The fourth argument is one that Davenport calls the artifact argument.33 One’s identity 
will never be fully reducible to a narrative or a set of narratives, for the story-telling component 
of narrative identity requires that certain experience, details, or facts of the matter be omitted from 
the narrative on the basis that doing so helps create cohesion. As Strawson claims, quoting V.S. 
Pritchett, “We live… beyond any tale that we happen to enact.”34 If this is true, so much for the 
psychological thesis. 
The final argument is the revision argument. As its name suggests, it stems from the 
tendency to revise one’s life story, in terms of distortion or falsification, or perhaps even, 
complete fabrication. If “retelling one’s past leads to changes, smoothings, enhancements, [and] 
shifts away from the facts,” then “the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you risk 
moving away from accurate self-understanding.”35 Rather than being a means toward self-
understanding, narrative identity hinders it. In sum, if the episodic style has metaphysical 
precedence over the diachronic one, and if Strawson’s characterization of narrative identity is 
true, then neither the psychological nor ethical theses are true. 
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THE DESCRIPTIVE INESCAPABILITY OF EXPERIENCE: FROM STRAWSON’S THESES TO 
RICŒUR’S HERMENEUTICS  
In order to create a path for which Ricœur’s account of narrative identity can emerge, two 
possible moves can be made. 1) We may directly argue against Strawson’s account of episodicity, 
reaffirming the diachronic style, and thus continue operating within Strawson’s conceptual 
framework. 2) We may question the basic presupposition that Strawson implicitly relies upon in 
order to make the distinction between diachronicity and episodicity in the first place. Following 
the second path will highlight	 the	 gulf	 between Strawson’s framework and Ricœur’s. If we are 
interested in developing Ricœur’s hermeneutic account of narrative identity as a viable 
alternative to Strawson’s account, then I think making the second move is the more advantageous 
option. 
Much of Strawson’s critique rests on his favoring of episodic selfhood. If episodicity is 
true, then any priority granted to narrative accounts of identity risk (mis)leading the subject away 
from the ‘true’ nature of what it means to be a self. A narrative account of oneself is a varnish that 
is added to reality, but it is nevertheless unreal. It conceals the episodic truth. Any recourse to 
narrative is to make an unnecessary philosophical move. 
Yet it seems that Strawson’s argument for episodicity rests on a presupposition that 
Ricœur would regard with suspicion. As much as Strawson would most likely deny that he is a 
part of this tradition, it seems that he relies upon a philosophical move set that belongs firmly in 
what Ricœur would classify as “reflexive philosophy.”36 Strawson’s argument for episodicity, in 
other words, presupposes that the self of self-knowledge—whether it is a singular, unified self, a 
Cartesian cogito, or whether it consists in having a Strawsonian account of multiple, transient 
selves—is graspable, knowable, through direct intuition. One has privileged—non-linguistic—
access to oneself “from the inside,” as Strawson himself has stated. 
The question now must be raised: is it the case that one has—or can have—direct, 
privileged, ‘from-the-inside’ access to the nature of one’s own self? Ricœur would deny this. Let 
me be clear. It is not that Ricœur would deny the intentional structure of consciousness. It is not 
that he would deny that every conscious experience of something also implies a subject of 
experience by which the object earns its sense of ‘givenness’. However, what he would suggest is 
that taking the ‘return path’, by way of reflection—from the object of experience to the subject of 
experience—is one that will be marked by an infinite process whereby “active syntheses 
continually refer to ever more radical passive syntheses.”37 To use Husserl’s terminology, there is 
no direct philosophical route that one can take when analyzing the intentional structure of an 
experience that would allow the reflecting subject to effortlessly move from the noematic content 
of an intentional act to its noetic content. Each step in this reflective path is tasked with clarifying 
a dense, tightly knit network of phenomenological concepts (e.g. pretension, retention, 
affectivity) that continually refer to other concepts (e.g. hyletic data, internal time consciousness, 
etc.)  
If Ricœur is correct, there is no hope for direct self-knowledge; it is forever out of reach. 
Immediately, this means two things. First, we cannot assess the truth-value of the central claims 
of Strawson’s argument for multiple selves; the grounds from which he made it have dissolved. 
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Second, and perhaps more interesting, we can begin to understand the model of subjectivity to 
which Ricœur’s account of narrative identity will respond. For Ricœur, at the heart of our 
subjectivity is a temporal fission. I never fully coincide with myself. This fault line that is forever 
etched onto the structure of my identity means that who I am is first and foremost a question that 
demands to be answered.38 
How can one begin to answer the question of selfhood? If, as Ricœur contends, a direct 
path is closed off, then the only avenue left open is an indirect path. The subject of experience can 
only come to any sort of self-understanding through the interpretation of the symbolic network 
to which it belongs. “There is no self-understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols, and 
texts; in the last resort, understanding coincides with the interpretation given to these mediating 
terms.”39 Even the most basic perceptual experience of something, Ricœur would contend, is 
always already permeated with a symbolic structure that could only become meaningful via 
interpretation. Thus, when Strawson40 wonders why one would, “while in the beauty of being,” 
seek to understand an experience with greater clarity via narrative, Ricœur would respond: 
Experience in all its fullness… has an expressibility [disibilité] in principle. Experience can 
be said, it demands41 to be said. To bring it to language is not to change it into something 
else, but in articulating and developing it, to make it become itself.42 
Indeed, Ricœur would contend that we have arrived at the central question to which 
narrative is an answer. If time constitutes one of the fundamental problems of human existence—
if it is at the heart of the structure of personal identity—then it is through narrative that we can 
begin to unravel it. 
My basic hypothesis, in this regard, is the following: the common feature of human 
experience, that which is marked, organized, and clarified by the act of storytelling in all its 
forms, is its temporal character. Everything that is recounted occurs in time, takes time, unfolds 
temporally, and what unfolds in time can be recounted. Perhaps, indeed, every temporal process 
is recognized as such only to the extent that it can, in one way or another, be recounted.43  
Thus, while Strawson would maintain that the recourse to narrative is an unnecessary 
move for adequate self-knowledge, Ricœur would respond that it is the best move we can make, 
if we seriously consider 1) that we have no direct access to ourselves; and 2) that self-knowledge 
only comes as the fruit of an interpretive process. 
To put it into the perspective of the maturation of Ricœur’s own thought, this is why 
Ricœur’s hermeneutic philosophy moved away from being a strict phenomenology of 
consciousness, and started to reconfigure itself as a philosophical anthropology, where both 
discourse and action were the central starting points. The same is true of Ricœur’s concept of 
narrative. Narrativity—and by extension, narrative identity—is not, first and foremost, a 
psychological phenomenon, as Strawson posits it, but a cultural one, conditioned by the dialectic 
at root at the historical tradition to which one belongs. 
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THE DIALECTIC OF SELFHOOD: PERSONAL IDENTITY AND NARRATIVE IDENTITY  
Within Ricœur’s hermeneutics, narrative identity performs a specific task: it poetically 
resolves the “aporia” of personal identity, which Ricœur dubs the problem of permanence in 
time.44 More recently, others have identified this as the problem of diachronic unity.45 If time is a 
central issue for human existence, what can guarantee that I am the same person who has 
continued over several gaps in time? As is the case with many of his contemporaries, Ricœur did 
not believe that the answer to this question comes from a recapitulation of substance dualism. But 
neither is it the case that one should deny any or all continuity of one’s identity, or one’s ‘self’. 
The choice between substantialism and non-self is, in Ricœur’s work, a false dichotomy. There is 
another avenue to pursue: establish a non-substantialist account of selfhood. As Ricœur admits, 
this is not without its difficulties. The self—understood non-substantially—is a fragile 
phenomenon. Philosophically, it is fragile because it rests on a twofold dialectic: that between 
what Ricœur calls idem (identity understood as ‘sameness’) and ipse (identity understood as 
‘selfhood’ and within this dialectic, that of narrativity itself.) It is not without great care, then, that 
one can bring out how selfhood is constituted within Ricœur’s hermeneutics. 
There is another way in which selfhood presents itself as a fragile phenomenon: the 
process of living itself. With the absence of the substantialist placebo—of a ‘true’ or ‘ideal’ self 
that will always resist time’s scars—the model of selfhood Ricœur will adopt is one that is forever 
exposed to the traumas of existence: aging, violence, mortality. As we will see, Ricœur’s non-
substantial self is not immutable, but neither is it powerless. With that, this section will unfold in 
two steps. First, we will look at the dialectic of idem and ipse. From there, we will develop, 
finally, narrative identity in Ricœur’s hermeneutics. 
1. Ricœur’s original contribution to the problem of personal identity resides in the 
dialectical relationship between idem and ipse. According to Ricœur, the history of philosophy 
has been preoccupied with understanding identity—and therefore with attempting to resolve the 
problem of diachronic unity—solely through the aegis of idem-identity; that is, identity 
understood simply as ‘sameness’.46 Here, the paradigmatic question of selfhood is a matter of 
“what”—i.e., “what is the self?” There is another way to understand identity. It is possible to 
investigate it through the aegis of ipse-identity, where the paradigmatic question is one of 
“who”—i.e. “who is the self; who am I?” Fittingly, Ricœur does not wish to have idem and ipse 
oppose each other. Rather, in order to better understand identity, we must think through their 
complicated relationship. Let us proceed, then, as Ricœur does. First with idem, followed by its 
relationship with ipse, and finally, ipse itself. 
The history of philosophy has dealt almost exclusively with identity as it is understood 
through the rubric of sameness. With such a vast history, Ricœur notes the polysemy of the 
notion of sameness. In terms of identity, sameness can signify four different meanings. It is the 
fourth meaning that is most relevant to personal identity, and it is also this meaning that 
instantiated substantialist notions of selfhood. Since the fourth meaning of ‘sameness’ is the most 
philosophically relevant, I will focus solely on it.47 
The final understanding of sameness is that of permanence in time. Here, Ricœur notes 
that this notion has been read in terms of a permanence of structure.48 Despite all the life-
changing events one may go through, one remains the same through the structure of their 
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identity. Historically, this structure has been interpreted as something that is over, above, and 
beyond the event itself. Here, we arrive at the birth of the notion of substance. Yet, has it not been 
the case that the history of philosophy has shown that substantialist understandings of self are 
simply too good to be true? Does the notion of sameness taken as permanence in time necessarily 
lead to having to posit the self as a substantialist, ontologically distinct entity apart from 
experience? Is it possible for there to be a “form of permanence in time which can be connected to 
the question ‘who’ inasmuch as it is irreducible to any question of ‘what’? Is there a form of 
permanence in time that is a reply to the question ‘who am I’?”49 According to Ricœur, it is 
possible to interpret the notion of permanence in time, without falling into the perils of 
substantialism. But this will require exploring the relationship between idem and ipse. 
The goal that Ricœur has in mind is that of finding the point of unification between the 
“what” of sameness (idem) and the “who” of selfhood (ipse.) At the nucleus of this relationship is 
the intermediary concept of ‘character’. Ricœur’s conclusion is going to be that, in terms of 
personal identity, one’s character is the “what” that also announces the “who” that one is.50 
Before we get to this, however, we must ask what Ricœur means by character. Within the 
confines of Oneself as Another, Ricœur states that one’s character consists of a set of lasting, though 
not necessarily immutable, dispositions that permit one to be recognized.51 
The formation of the dispositions of one’s character stems from a twofold dialectical 
process: 1) the dialectic of innovation and sedimentation involved in the acquisition of one’s 
habits; and 2) the dialectic of otherness and internalization involved in what Ricœur calls 
“acquired identifications.”52 Of particular importance to the dialectic of innovation and 
sedimentation is the role of embodiment. Of note is the reading of the body as a site of conflict for 
the development of a new habit. Sedimented in one’s ways, the initial moment of innovative 
activity is most often met with resistance by the body. Think of the guitarist who struggles, not 
with the instrument, but with her own fingers, to make a chord progression. Think of a martial 
artist struggling with her sense of equilibrium, as she maintains the posture required of her art. 
Nevertheless, after much practice or repetition, what was once resisted can become internalized, 
to the point of being second nature.53 In becoming second nature, the acquired habit contributes 
to the overall lasting dispositions that shape one’s character. With the formation of a new habit 
added to one’s embodied being, so too, is there now a mark with which one can be identified and 
re-identified.54 Thus, the “what” of one’s character habits grants access to the “who” of whom 
one is speaking. 
While the acquisition of a new habit hinges upon the internal dialectic of innovation and 
sedimentation—“internal” because it deals solely with the body’s struggle with itself—the 
dialectic of acquired identifications is external—for it implies the subject’s relationship with 
culture. Here, we can refer back to what was established earlier in this paper: according to 
Ricœur, the ‘shortest’ route towards self-understanding is the indirect one by which one 
interprets oneself according to the vast symbolic structures of one’s culture. “To a large extent, in 
fact, the identity of a person… is made up of these identifications with values, norms, ideals, 
models, and heroes in which the person… recognizes [him- or herself].”55 For example, in 
recognizing my own struggle in the trials and tribulations of, say, Peter Parker, I begin to 
recognize these struggles by those of Peter Parker. My understanding of myself is made possible 
by metaphorically seeing myself as Peter Parker. The otherness inherent in this cultural icon—
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because we all know that I am not really Peter Parker—is internalized and annulled. Of course, let 
us not get too lost in the charm of utilizing pop culture as a means towards better self-
understanding. There is a larger point here. Namely, in the process by which one learns to 
recognize oneself in, through, and by a cultural icon, value, or ideal, one also starts to establish a 
sense of integrity, a sense of who one is.56 To be true to oneself, then, is to be true to the cultural 
icons that constitute oneself. What would Peter Parker do? 
This is why behavior that does not correspond to dispositions of this sort makes us say 
that it is not in the character of the individual in question, that this person is not herself or even 
that the person is acting completely out of character.57 
Again, we arrive at the same position, this time perhaps more profoundly: the “what” of 
one’s character leads us to better understand the “who” that one is. Through the intermediary 
role of character, we acquire a form of permanence in time that is not reducible to substantialism. 
Yet, the totality of one’s identity is not fully reducible to the paradigm of idem, as well as 
its relationship with ipse. In a very real sense, understanding oneself requires exploring the 
significance of one’s ipseity. According to Ricœur, while idem and ipse do not mutually exclude 
each other to the point of making any mediation between the two impossible, there still exists a 
gap between idem and ipse.58 Whereas Ricœur’s study concerning the dialectic of character 
reveals a sense of permanence in time that is attributable to the continuity—i.e. unbroken or 
consistent nature—of one’s dispositions, habits, and acquired identifications, his understanding 
of ipse-identity hinges on a sense of constancy. Here, constancy denotes a faithfulness or 
dependability that rests not on one’s character, but on one’s commitment. “The continuity of 
character is one thing, the constancy of friendship is quite another.”59 
What Ricœur is trying to get at with ipse, is a dimension of identity that is primordially 
active. This could be one of the reasons why the act of making—and keeping—a promise is his 
preferred example when attempting to illustrate the significance of ipse-identity. If time is an 
agent of change, if character is about continuity in time, then keeping a promise is to stand in 
defiance of time. In keeping a promise, one commits oneself to someone or something, despite 
whatever any change might occur between the moment the promise was made, and the moment 
it is fulfilled. “In this respect, keeping one’s promise… does indeed appear to stand as a challenge 
to time, a denial of change: even if my desire were to change, even if I were to change my opinion 
or inclination, ‘I will hold firm’.”60 We should read ipse-identity existentially. It pertains to the 
active horizon of one’s identity, wherein one (authentically) makes a commitment to someone or 
something beyond oneself, and holds oneself to that choice. 
2. It is within the dialectic between idem and ipse that Ricœur proposes his own account 
of narrative identity. As stated at the beginning of this section, Ricœur is making a technical 
move. In order to establish narrative identity, he is philosophically jury-rigging two dialectics: 
that of idem and ipse, and that of the threefold mimetic structure of narrative, which he 
developed in Time and Narrative.61 The proposed goal of Ricœur’s hermeneutic gambit is to 
poetically resolve the problem of permanence in time. By virtue of appropriating key aspects of 
narrative’s threefold mimetic structure, one is able to weave unity and stability out of the 
diversity, variability, and discontinuity of lived experience.62 As stated earlier in this paper, it is 
not that we ‘naturally’ or spontaneously view ourselves as belonging to a story—as Strawson’s 
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psychological thesis suggests—it is that the tools that narrative understanding equips us with 
enables us to more deeply explore and express our subjectivity—both in terms of idem and ipse. 
As we saw earlier, understanding idem-identity required exploring the notion of 
character in Ricœur’s philosophy. One’s character hinges upon the habits that arise out of the 
dialectic of innovation and sedimentation, as well as that of one’s acquired identifications. 
According to Ricœur, the model of emplotment (Mimesis2)—when grafted onto the dialectic of 
innovation and sedimentation—serves as a privileged way to bring out the rich history 
surrounding the development of one’s character.63 As Ricœur argues, left by itself, sedimentation 
tends to obscure the creativity involved in the initial moment of innovation—not to mention the 
struggle of establishing a habit. Creating a narrative about the history of one’s character 
development—about the journey one embarked upon, and the struggle one found—brings out 
layers of meaning that would otherwise be forgotten. Perhaps the crafted story is used to take 
stock of one’s life—to appreciate how far one has truly come, and how far one still needs to go. 
Perhaps it is told to console someone else, who is now facing a similar situation. Think of the 
philosophy student who is endeavoring to understand Kantian deontology, but who is unsure of 
her own intellectual potential. What is the appropriate response to the student’s struggle? 
Ricœur’s proposal: a story of our shared experience. 
If the structure of narrative was only capable of disclosing the history of one’s habit 
formations, then it would be an inherently backwards looking phenomenon. According to 
Ricœur, this is not the case. Narrative identity is not just limited to disclosing one’s past; it is also 
capable of orienting one towards the future, toward “the global project of an existence.”64 The 
idea here is that it is through the means of emplotment that one is able to create, refine, or revise a 
life plan—the “practical units” that make up one’s professional, personal, and family life.65 Life 
plans are not static blue prints; they are flexible plans of action that emerge from one’s habits—or 
practices—and the “mobile” ideals one adopts through the process of acquired identifications.66 
Between the relationship of one’s habits and one’s ideals exists a hermeneutic circle—i.e. one’s 
habits help shape one’s ideals, and one’s ideals help orient and establish new habits. According to 
Ricœur, by adhering to one’s life plan, one is able to establish, borrowing from MacIntyre,67 
narrative unity of life—a form of concordance that holds discordance at its epicenter: discordant 
concordance.68 
Narrativity does not simply bring out deeper textures implied by idem-identity. 
According to Ricœur, there is also an important sense in which the mimetic structure of narrative 
mediates with ipse-identity: it discloses the insight that human living is always already ethical in 
nature.69 Whereas the fundamental polemic concerning idem-identity revolved around the 
continuity of one’s character, that of ipse was uniquely concerned with one’s self-constancy. 
Whereas, idem was concerned with of what one is made, ipse is concerned with who one is. 
According to Ricœur, the notion of self-constancy central to ipse-identity fundamentally entails our 
relationships with other human beings.70  
Ipse-identity is primarily intersubjective in nature. The ‘call’ or demand for self-
constancy prefigures a relationship with others, so that others may count on us. That is, if self-
constancy is an issue concerning my being-in-the-world—concerning my very identity—then it is 
an issue placed upon me by the other. It is an issue of being trustworthy, and being held 
accountable for my actions. The desire for self-constancy discloses one’s responsibility to others.71 
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Ricœur, perhaps in his most Levinasian moment, maintains that there is an ambiguous double 
meaning to one’s responsibility.72 To be responsible means both to be counted on by another, and 
to be accountable for oneself. 
Where does narrative feature? If it is true that ipse-identity is always already 
intersubjective in nature, then it must also be the case that the ‘who’ question—so central to 
ipse—is also intersubjective. It is only in other words, through, by, and with my relationship with 
others that ‘who’ I am becomes an issue for me. It is only through, by, and with others that I am 
asked, and can begin to ask myself, “who am I?” If human existence was not intersubjective in 
nature, then the question of identity would have never become a philosophical problem. If it is 
the other who first and foremost asks of me the question “who am I?” and who obliges me to 
respond, then it is through narrative means that I can begin to address myself to the other. The 
“who” that I am is not substantialist in nature. It is only accessible via the story that I tell to the 
other, and conditioned—i.e. limited—by the scene of address, to borrow from Butler, in which we 
found ourselves.73 
In being asked to give an account of myself, I am rendered accountable by the other. In 
responding to the other, I accept responsibility for my past actions, and for the intended outcome 
of my life plan. Yet, there is fragility here. If Ricœur is correct, then I never fully know ‘who’ I am 
until I am confronted with this question. Despite this, we are all tasked to respond to this fragility 
with assertiveness and with a commitment that goes beyond all doubt: Who am I? Here I am.74 
OPAQUE SELVES: A RICŒURIAN RESPONSE TO STRAWSON  
We have taken many detours to reach this point. The time has come now to fully develop 
and lay out a Ricœurian response to Strawson’s anti-narrativist argument. Let us proceed by 
responding to each argument in the order of its appearance. 
     The first argument that merits a response is not necessarily one of Strawson’s anti-
narrativist arguments, but rather, his argument in favor of episodicity over diachronicity. If it can 
be shown that there is a reason to doubt this argument, then there will be reason to doubt all of 
Strawson’s anti-narrativist arguments which implicitly or explicitly rely on the truth of 
episodicity over diachronicity. As a refresher, here is the argument, as presented earlier. 
What we call a “self” emerges from conscious lived experience. 
Corresponding to each conscious lived experience is a distinct mental state (e.g. 
imagination is different from perception, which is different from memory, etc.) 
If the self emerges from conscious lived experience, and each experience has a distinct 
mental state, then there is not one self, but many—one for each distinct experience. 
Therefore, episodicity is true. 
In actuality, the response to this argument was earlier laid out: it seems that Strawson 
relies upon direct intuition in order to assert the truth of the premises. However, it is this very 
methodology which Ricœur’s hermeneutics calls into doubt. I shall develop this further below. 
First, I would like to point out an additional problem with premise two. While we would all 
readily admit that certain mental states are distinct from each other—e.g. imagining a hike 
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through the Rocky Mountains is certainly distinct from remembering what it was actually like to 
go on such a hike—it does not follow that there is no overlap between certain mental states. 
Indeed—to further use memory and imagination—while each may have certain unique 
phenomenological characteristics, there is still a great deal that they do share. Both memory and 
imagination entail the phenomenology of perception, the intentional structure of consciousness, 
embodiment, the first person perspective, etc. While it is possible, and fruitful, to indicate what 
makes each clear and distinct, let us not forget that this comes at the cost of bracketing what they 
share. Further, if there is overlap, and if the self emerges from these experiences, can we truly go 
as far as Strawson wishes to go with episodicity? 
     That was only the smaller version of the problem with Strawson’s argument. The 
larger issue comes from the intuitive nature by which Strawson wishes to assert the truth of his 
premises. That is, it is by attending to the nature of experience, and the mental states that arise 
from experience, that we can intuitively verify the episodic nature of the self. The truth of this is 
verified by the clear and distinct nature of intuition itself; it is so basic that it needs no further 
justification. It is evidential on its own. Yet, Ricœur would offer the very same objection that 
Menary has recently made of intuition as a method of verification.75 Strawson rests on a 
Cartesian model by which direct intuition can be taken as a reliable access to truth. By intuition of 
the nature of the mental processes/states that correlate with lived experience, Strawson concludes 
that episodicity is true. However, can we truly rely on intuition? What if it is the case that what 
we think is intuitive is, rather and at best, inferential--and thus, fallible--in nature? As Menary 
argues, if we had the capacity to distinguish between inferential and intuitive mental states, then 
there would not be any question as to which insights were inferential in nature, and which were 
intuitive in nature.76 Yet, is it not the case that there can, and often is, great controversy as to 
whether something is true by intuition, or whether it is simply an inference? One need only refer 
to Strawson’s own distinction between diachronicity and episodicity. According to his argument, 
intuitively attending to the nature of one’s mental life reveals the episodic truth of selfhood. Yet, 
if the truth of episodicity was so crystal clear on the basis of intuition alone, why is it the case that 
many hold diachronicity to be true, on the basis of what they would say is their own intuition? 
Hence, if Strawson's arguments in favor of episodicity hinge exclusively on direction intuition, 
then it seems that Ricœur would have reason to doubt the truth of episodicity over that of 
diachronicity. Intuition alone is not enough evidence to assert the truth of one position over 
another. 
The hermeneutic gesture here is that, if we want to understand the nature of the self, we 
can only do so indirectly through the interpretation of vast symbolic structures that—as 
symbols—stand in the place of direct lived experience. Narrative—and the tools we use to 
interpret it—is one such structure. However, the structure of narrative is not simply one amongst 
many others. Emplotment refigures human (inter-)action as it persists through time—whether it 
is futile or fructiferous. As such, if we want to understand the nature of the self, the best place to 
start is through its narrative dimensions. 
With that, we can now move through the rest of Strawson’s arguments with less effort. 
We dubbed the second formal argument as the argument from episodicity. 
Episodicity is true. 
If episodicity is true, then we do not experience ourselves narratively. 
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Therefore, the psychological narrative thesis—i.e. that human beings naturally 
experience their lives as already having a plot-like structure—is false. 
Given the problems we encountered with Strawson’s argument for episodicity, it seems 
that the truth of the first premise is, at best unclear, and at worst, false. Either way, this argument 
is unconvincing. However, allow me to make things a little more interesting. Ricœur, I think 
would also reject the psychological thesis. For him, it is not the case that we naturally experience 
ourselves in narrative terms. Rather, we appropriate certain features of narrativity in order to 
better understand lived experience, and ourselves. Rather than being a psychological 
phenomenon, narrative is an ontological condition of possibility: it is through narrative means 
that we can understand what it means to be a self. 
The next argument was the argument from narrative egoism. 
Narrativity entails finding forms of repetitive patterns that make up a story of one’s life. 
In searching for these forms, one focuses only on oneself. 
Focusing only on oneself inhibits, rather than promotes, ethical action. 
Therefore, we should not adopt narrative identity. 
Perhaps this argument works on the other theories of narrative identity, but clearly, it is 
preposterous to apply this to Ricœur’s. Let us simply recall that, for Ricœur, narrative is the 
answer to the very question posed by ipse-identity: Who am I? Further, it is not I who asks this 
question of myself, it is the other. According to Ricœur, selfhood is fundamentally intersubjective 
in nature. One cannot begin to understand oneself in the absence of another, and moreover, the 
initial character of self-understanding is ethical in nature. That is, in giving an account of myself, 
my life story is always already a response to a moral summons. Even the most mundane story that 
I can tell of myself to another has a moral dimension: it builds trust, and establishes a sense of 
self-constancy—the latter of which we might hold to be essential for an ethical life. On these 
grounds, we simply cannot recognize Ricœur’s theory of narrative identity in Strawson’s 
argument. 
Let us now turn to the artifact argument. 
Giving an account of oneself necessarily entails that certain details, experience, or facts of 
the matter be omitted for the aesthetic smoothness of the story. 
If experiences, details, or facts of the matter are omitted, then one’s life is not exhausted 
by narrative. 
If one’s life is not exhausted by narrative, then one’s life is not reducible to narrative 
identity. 
Therefore, life is not narrative. 
Recently, Davenport has attempted to refute the artifact argument’s conclusion by 
developing the concept of the “narravive,” which states that lived experience is always already 
experienced in a sort of narrative-like way.77 I do not want to go in this direction, and I do not 
think Ricœur would go in this direction either—as it seems like it might repeat Strawson’s 
psychological thesis, which Ricœur would reject. I think Ricœur would question premise three. 
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Just because one’s life is not exhausted by narrative, it does not mean that there is nothing to 
gain—in terms of self-understanding—by appropriating aspects of the structure of narrative. To 
the contrary, Ricœur would argue that narrative identity affords us the opportunity to return to 
previous slivers of our life-story. Further, in returning to our life-story, we are presented with the 
possibility of reinterpreting a particular experience or chapter—I use the word metaphorically, of 
course—in order to derive new meaning, and in order to inspire action. That the lived experience 
I narrate exceeds the story I tell is a good thing. It means that there is a wealth of meaning-
potential that can be mined by the task of hermeneutic understanding. 
It is precisely here where Strawson would retort with the revision argument. 
Telling one’s life-story can lead to revising it. 
Revision is distortion or falsification. 
If telling one’s life story leads to revision, then, in giving an account of oneself, one serves 
only to move further and further away from the truth of who one is. 
Therefore, we should not adopt narrative identity. 
Ricœur would respond in two ways. The first involves premise two. It seems that 
Strawson assumes that revision only ever entails distortion. In this sense, revision is not just a 
form of distortion, it also a form of deception, and if so, revision is coercive in nature. Yet, this is 
clearly false. Not all cases of revising one’s life story are deceptive or distorted. It is neither 
uncommon nor dishonest that we reflect on, or simply revisit, past experiences, and re-
contextualize their meaning. In doing this, we find patterns that translate to life lessons, find 
struggles that turn into triumphs (or vice versa.) The present casts new light on the past, and the 
past casts new light on the present. When this hermeneutic circle is a healthy one, Ricœur would 
argue that it serves to inspire new courses of action, new ways of being. 
Not all cases of revision are deceptive. Still, some are. What would be Ricœur’s response 
here? Clearly, Ricœur would see this as a moral problem. Yet, I would raise two points: First, 
taking Ricœur’s notion of narrative identity seriously entails an intersubjective relation with other 
human beings. As has already been mentioned, this relation always already discloses the moral 
dimension of human living. My life story conveys a sense of trust. One cannot be trustworthy—in 
the moral sense of the word—without being honest. Thus, if we take Ricœur’s account seriously, 
in that we seek to be Ricœurian in how we capitulate our own narrative identity, any revisions 
we make to our life story ought not be deceptive in nature. Second, I would like to briefly bolster 
this position with the notion of the debt to the past that Ricœur develops in Time and Narrative 
and in Memory, History, Forgetting.78 Accordingly, each and every one of us has a debt to the 
past—a debt that discloses a duty to live with a sense of fidelity that respects the past suffering 
and injustices to which humanity has been exposed both by the toll of history, and by the tragedy 
of our own inhumanity. Here, I would like to add the following: my debt to the past also entails a 
duty to not distort my own past. Where the temptation arises, I owe it to myself and others to 
refrain from (inauthentically) representing my past. I ought to take responsibility for it. If I live 
according to this duty, then Strawson’s argument need not be a concern. 
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CONCLUSION 
The confrontation between Ricœur’s hermeneutic understanding of narrative identity 
and Strawson’s anti-narrative arguments ought to be viewed in a healthy, productive way. For 
our purposes, this confrontation has afforded us the opportunity to approach Ricœur’s account of 
narrative identity in a different context—specifically, one that shows where Ricœur’s account of 
identity differs from his contemporaries’, as well as how he would respond to the variety of 
objections capitulated by Strawson. As we have seen, Ricœur’s hermeneutic understanding of 
narrative identity is able to withstand and respond to all of Strawson’s objections. To the extent 
that these objections rest on his episodic understanding of selfhood, and to the extent that this 
understanding of selfhood rests primarily on intuition, Ricœur would respond that intuition 
alone is not enough to understand the nature of selfhood or identity. Rather, the shortest path to 
self-understanding is via a ‘detour’, as Ricœur would say, which entails reflecting on, and 
interpreting, one’s lived experiences through the structure of narrative configuration. Narrativity, 
then, ought to be cast in a new light—namely, as an ontological condition of possibility. It is 
through narrative that understanding ‘who’ I am becomes possible in the first place. 
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over a series of events, including reversals of fortune which resist and threaten the story’s overall 
coherence—i.e. create discordance. Hence, Ricœur’s term to identify all narratives as a form of 
‘discordant concordance’. Lastly, the final stage of mimesis—Mimesis3 or “refiguration”—involves the 
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